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An Investigation of Internet Auction Markets:  Evidence from eBay 
 
Kevin Bracker 
Ken Smith 
Pittsburg State University 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper was to examine a market with different characteristics than a typical 
“financial” market using high frequency continuous transactions data.  The market selected for this 
purpose was an Internet auction market for collectibles, specifically Ty Glory Bears™ sold on the eBay, 
Inc. web site.  This market was chosen for its relatively high activity and homogeneity.  The results 
indicated evidence of signaling related to seller’s reputation and product information, seasonality based 
on day-of-the-week, and limited market depth. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial economists have a long history of examining the behavior of markets.  Traditionally, the focus 
has been on mainstream financial markets such as equities, bonds, and derivatives.  However, there has also been an 
interest in examining other non-traditional markets.  Gandar, et al (1988) and Gray and Gray (1997) are among the 
many researchers who explore the concept of efficiency in the NFL gambling markets.  Other sports betting markets 
such as basketball (Brown and Sauer, 1993), baseball (Woodland and Woodland, 1994), and horseracing (Asch, et 
al, 1982; Thaler and Ziemba, 1988) have also been studied.  Outside of the sports arena, Scott and Gulley (1995) and 
Papachristou and Karamanis (1998) both look at lottery markets.  These investigations have led to mixed evidence 
on the efficiency of gambling markets.1   
 
In addition to gambling markets, there has been a body of research into the area of collectibles markets.  
This has covered areas such as art (Bryan, 1985; Mok, et al, 1993; Matsumoto, et al, 1994; Pompe, 1996), stamps 
(Taylor, 1983; Cardell, et al, 1995), antique furniture (Graeser, 1993), coins (Dickie, et al, 1994), wine (Krasker, 
1979), sports cards (O'Brien and Gramling, 1995) and comic books (Ang, et al, 1983).  Most of these studies 
examine the return structure of the particular collectible market under investigation and consider its viability as an 
investment alternative based on its return as well as its correlation to more traditional financial investments (stocks, 
bonds, gold, etc.).  However, there is limited evidence on the nature of these market based on high-frequency 
transaction data over a condensed period of time.  There are three reasons for the lack of attention to this aspect of 
the collectibles market.  First, the collectibles market has historically been extremely segmented by regional 
preferences.  This makes it difficult to develop a meaningful database of transactions that aren't greatly influenced 
by regional biases.  Second, often collectibles are distinctive making it difficult to separate market influences from 
product differences such as quality of condition from transaction to transaction.  For example, a primary objective in 
Taylor's (1983) examination of the stamp market is developing a methodology to separate differences in quality 
from differences in price.  Finally, there has not been a good source of high-frequency transaction data for a 
continuous time collectibles market. 
 
This paper examines the auction of collectibles by using a continuous worldwide marketplace with a 
homogeneous product that eliminates the three problems described above.  Because the auction is conducted via the 
Internet, participants can see all recently completed auctions to generate an expectation of a market price.  One 
advantage of such an auction market is that with a worldwide market all participants are widely dispersed.  That is, 
they likely share no community (e.g., geographic, union) with other participants.  This reduces the likelihood of 
collusive behavior and, more importantly, eliminates the geographic premiums that are often apparent in collectible 
markets.   
 
The wealth of data available through Internet auction markets has generated a growing body of interest 
(McDonald and Slawson, 2002; Houser and Wooders, 2001; Bajari and Hortacsu, 2002; Katkar and Lucking-Reiley, 
2001; Melnik and Alm, 2002, and Roth and Ockenfels, 2000.)  These papers tend to focus on using the Internet 
auction data to address theoretical related to auctions.  For example, Roth and Ockenfels (2000) examine the 
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rationale behind last-second bidding (“sniping”) behavior using data from both eBay and Amazon auctions with 
computers and antiques.   As an alternative, our focus is not on the explanation of auction activity, but on 
characteristics and activity of the market prices.  Specifically, how do issues related to traditional financial markets 
such as seasonality, information signaling, and market depth reveal themselves in a non-traditional financial market?  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data for this study is collected from the Internet site managed by eBay, Inc.  This is currently the 
largest Internet auction market with over 9 million auctions running at a given point in time and over 49 million 
registered participants.  The eBay site can be found at http://www.ebay.com.  The closing transaction price from 
3359 individual auctions that ended between 12:00 AM PST July 5th and 12:00 PM PST August 4th, 1998 were 
recorded.  The item being auctioned in all instances was one or more Glory Bear Beanie Babies™ produced by Ty, 
Inc.  Figures 1-4 illustrate the pattern transaction data in a graphical format. 
 
The following graphs plot the price (Figure One) and return (Figure Two) of Ty Glory Bear Beanie 
Babies™ with completed auctions on eBay between 12:00 AM PST July 5th and 12:00 PM PST August 4th, 1998.  
The return is defined as the percentage change in price from the previous transaction.  Both graphs include all 
observations. 
Figure 1:  Ty Glory Bear Beanie Babies, eBay Auction , July 5th
Figure One
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The specific item being auctioned was carefully selected to meet two primary criteria.  First, the item being 
auctioned had to be homogeneous in nature.  Many items available in Internet auction markets do not meet this 
criterion.  Older collectibles such as coins and trading cards can vary in value dramatically based on condition.  At 
the time of this sample, the Glory Bear Beanie Baby™ was a new release, which helped insure that all auctions were 
for items that were in similar condition.  By using a homogeneous item, we can determine that the price change is 
not due to changes in the nature of the item being sold.  The second primary criterion for consideration in item 
selection is an active market.  During the sample period, there was an average of 186.125 completed auctions for 
$20,202.06 in Glory Bear Beanie Babies™ each day.   Such an active market allows for price discovery since 
current prices for recently completed transactions are readily available.  Many items available on Internet auction 
markets have far less active markets.2  Table One provides summary statistics for the sample of transactions used in 
this study. 
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Figure 2:  Ty Glory Bear Beanie Babies, eBay Auction, August 4th 
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The following graphs plot the price (Figure Three) and return (Figure Four) of Ty Glory Bear Beanie 
Babies™ with completed auctions on eBay between 12:00 AM PST July 5th and 12:00 PM PST August 4th, 1998.   
The return is defined as the percentage change in price from the previous transaction.  Both graphs exclude all 
observations in which the return is greater than ±20%. 
 
Figure 3:  Ty Glory Bear Beanie Babies, eBay Completed Auction, July 5th  
Figure Three
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Figure 4:  Ty Glory Bear Beanie Babies, eBay Completed Auction, August 4th  
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Table  
 
 
Table One 
Summary Statistics for Price and Return 
 
Table one displays summary statistics for the transaction price and return (percentage change in the price 
from the previous transaction) of Ty Glory Bear Beanie Babies™ with completed auctions on eBay between 12:00 
AM PST July 5th and 12:00 PM PST August 4th, 1998.  These summary statistics are reported for both all 
transactions and for a subset where the returns fall between -20% and 20%.  The rational for the removal of returns 
falling outside the range of -20% and 20% is to eliminate "questionable" transactions.  This also improves the 
"normalcy" of the returns by greatly reducing the kurtosis ("fat-tails").  The Augmented Dicky-Fuller test statistics 
demonstrate that there is not a unit-root present in the time-series of prices or returns. 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics for Price and Return  
 
 All Observations Observations with Returns between  
-20% and 20% 
 Price Return Price Return 
N 3359 3358   3058 3058
Minimum 30.13 -73.8% 50.63 -19.9%
Maximum 207.75 99.5% 177.52 19.9%
Mean 93.75 -0.03% 93.24 -0.11%
St. Deviation 27.235 11.90% 26.559 8.04%
Skewness 0.545 0.232 0.495 0.058
Kurtosis -0.378 4.807 -0.623 -0.186
ADF Test Statistic -13.064 -36.896 -11.565 -25.099
 
Each auction has a wealth of information available, starting with pricing information.  The high bid on 
recently completed auctions as well as the current bid for this auction is readily available on the website.  This 
information aids potential buyers and sellers in the price discovery process by making the bids transparent.  By 
combining a high frequency of auctions and availability of past price data to give auction participants a relatively 
 
242 
Investigation Internet Auction Markets          Journal of International Technology and Information Management 
clear picture of the current “market price,” bidders are less likely to suffer from the “winner’s curse” frequently 
found in auction situations.  The winner’s curse occurs when, due to incomplete information about what competitors 
are willing to pay, the winning bid is a price greater than the minimum amount necessary to win the auction.  In 
addition, eBay uses a bidding system incorporating proxy bidding and relatively small minimum increments that 
helps to minimize the winner’s curse.3 
      
A second important piece of information is the time at which the auction ended.  This allows for an 
investigation into potential seasonality patterns related to time-of-day or day-of-the-week effects.  Also, the ending 
time can be used to measure the time elapsed between auctions.  Given that there is only one month’s data, it is 
difficult to draw reliable inferences from the day-of-the-week results.  The time-of-day results should be more 
reliable, although that is a relatively small sample as well (31 calendar days).  Nonetheless, we include seasonal 
variables in an attempt to capture potential anomalies.  We find pricing anomalies which buyers can use to lower the 
prices they pay.  These are discussed below. 
  
Asymmetric information problems are inherent in any auction.  Once a bid is accepted, the buyer sends 
payment to the seller.   It is then up to the seller to send the item purchased.  There is always the possibility that 
sellers will either not deliver the item to the winning bidder or deliver it in less than a safe and timely manner.  To 
address this potential moral hazard problem, each seller is given a feedback rating.  This rating is designed to 
transmit information to potential bidders regarding the reputation of the seller.  Upon completion of an auction the 
bidder and seller are each allowed the opportunity to give feedback in the form of a short description of their 
transaction experience.  In addition, the person giving the feedback identifies it as a positive (+1), neutral (0), or 
negative (-1) experience.  An individual seller’s rating is the running total of their feedback from previous 
transactions.   
 
Each seller is also allowed the option of setting a reservation price.  The reservation price is not initially 
revealed to bidders.  Instead, until the reservation is met the listed high bid will include a statement that the reserve 
has not yet been met.  The reservation price allows the seller to avoid selling their product if they fail to obtain their 
private valuation.   
 
Adverse selection may also potentially be a problem in that the item being auctioned may not be in very 
good condition.  To address this asymmetric information problem, the seller can include a digital photo of the item 
to be displayed to potential bidders.  The less homogeneous the item being auctioned, the more important a photo 
will be to help reduce the information asymmetry between buyer and seller. 
 
Additionally, the seller has the option to place their item for sale in a featured category.  This costs the 
seller an additional $9.95, but places the auction in a more prominent place within the page layout, giving the item a 
greater exposure to more potential bidders.  The seller must consider this additional cost relative to the price 
received.  Obviously, this approach is not beneficial to the seller if the revenue generated by an item in a featured 
category is $9.95 or less than that generated in a non-featured category.  
 
eBay, Inc. runs many auctions for a single item, but there are also auctions run with multiple items for sale 
at the same time.  These auctions can take one of two forms.  The first is to sell the entire quantity to the highest 
bidder.  For example, instead of running N auctions selling a single Glory Bear Beanie Baby™ per auction, the 
seller can list N and sell them all to the highest single bidder.  Another technique is to run a Dutch auction.  In this 
form, a single auction is run for all N Glory Bear Beanie Babies™, but instead of going to a single bidder, up to N 
individuals can place winning bids.  The bids are ranked from highest to lowest with the N highest bids getting their 
item for the lowest successful bid price.  Dutch auctions and auctions selling multiple items as a single lot may result 
in lower prices if the market does not have enough depth to handle larger transactions.  We would expect multiple 
items being sold as a single lot to suffer from this depth issue to a greater extent as the personal collector will be less 
likely to participate and instead the market will be reduced to speculators and dealers.   
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
The above information will be used to examine several issues.  First, is there seasonality in the prices 
yielded from Internet auction markets?  For example, prices may be lower during the weekends when people are 
busy with other activities.  Alternatively, prices may be lower during the day while people are at work and higher 
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during the evenings when they are at home and have time to participate in such auctions.  Any systematic factor 
related to the day of the week or the time of day that influences supply or demand could cause seasonality to be 
present in prices.  These seasonality issues are analyzed through two different approaches.  First, the observations 
are segmented into day-of-the-week categories and into time-of-the-day categories.4  Mean prices across the 
different time periods are then compared.  Second, day-of-the-week dummy variables and time-of-the-day dummy 
variables are included in a regression analysis that controls for other effects (discussed below). 
 
In addition to seasonality issues, there is also potential for an information signaling effect to be conveyed 
from the seller to potential buyers.  When making purchases from Internet auction markets, the buyer typically pays 
for the item first and upon payment, the seller ships the item to the buyer.  This places the buyer at risk.  If payment 
is made and the seller is dishonest (fails to ship item or misrepresents the quality of the item) the buyer loses.  
Alternatively, a careless seller that delays shipment for an unreasonable time or packages the item poorly will also 
result in the bidder getting less "value" than was expected at the time of placing their bid.  eBay, Inc. attempts to 
solve these asymmetric information issues with several approaches.  Sellers with higher feedback ratings should be 
able to capture reputational capital in the form of higher average transaction prices.  In our analysis we use the log of 
the feedback rating (instead of the actual number itself) as it is reasonable to assume that each additional positive 
rating would carry a decreasing marginal value.  For example, someone with a feedback rating of 15 would seem far 
less risky than someone with a feedback rating of 2.  Conversely, the difference between a feedback rating of 213 
and 200 would seem relatively minor.5  By using the log of the feedback rating, the skewness of the variable is also 
reduced.  Additionally, digital pictures can help to provide information about the quality of the item to the bidder.  
Therefore, items that are sold with a digital image attached should sell for a higher price than items with no digital 
image. 
 
Another area to examine is the depth of the market.  What happens when there are multiple auctions for the 
same item very close together and/or single auctions with multiple quantities available (either as a Dutch auction or 
as a single lot) at the same time?  If the market is not significantly deep, such auctions will likely yield lower prices.  
This issue is examined by including three different variables.  First, a measurement of time between transactions 
(LTBT) is used.  This variable is represented by the log of the time between transactions measured in seconds.  By 
using the log, this variable will exhibit less skewness.  While the LTBT variable is primarily a liquidity variable (is 
the market able to support multiple auctions ending in close proximity to one another without impacting price), it 
may also be a proxy for the impact of the winner’s curse.  If there are many auctions ending in a short period of time 
there is less of a need to win a specific auction.  Therefore, the bidder is less apt to overbid.  However if the auctions 
are spaced far apart, bidders may feel a greater need to win a specific auction and thus bid a little higher.   Given the 
liquidity and winner’s curse implications, a positive relationship for the time between transactions and the price 
realized for the item is expected.  Two other closely related measurements are DUTCH, a dummy variable that 
equals one if the auction was a Dutch auction, and QUANTITY, a variable that captures the number of Glory 
Bears™ available as a lot to the highest bidder.  Inclusion of these variables allows us to test which form of auction 
yields greater revenue to the seller.  The coefficients (reported below) quantify the average price in a regular 
auction, the average price in a Dutch auction, and the average price in an auction where multiple items are sold to 
the highest bidder.  Again, if there are issues regarding the depth of these markets, it is reasonable to expect to 
observe negative relationships with the price for both DUTCH and QUANTITY. 
 
Three final issues to be addressed are visibility, reserve pricing, and a trend.  In order to increase visibility 
of the auction, the seller can select (for an additional fee) to place the item as a featured item.  Thus, a dummy 
variable, FEATURE, is introduced that takes a value of one if the auction was listed in the featured category and a 
zero otherwise.  If this visibility is important, we should expect to see a positive relationship with the price realized.  
Reserve prices can be set by the seller to ensure that the item is not sold unless it meets a specific price.  To 
recognize this, a dummy variable, RESERVE, is included to examine whether auctions with reserve prices increase 
the average realized price.  It is expected that reserve pricing will lead to higher average prices due to the 
elimination of accepting lower bids.  The third issue, apparent from looking at Figures One and Three, is that there is 
a significant downward trend in prices.  As more of the Glory Bears™ became available, their market value 
declined.  To control for this downward trend in prices a variable, COUNT, is introduced that represents the 
transaction number.  See Table Two for a summary of the independent variables (excluding seasonality dummy 
variables).  
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Tables Two and Three 
Variable Definition and Correlation Matrix 
 
The following tables provide a description of the independent variables used in the regression analysis 
component of this paper along with the correlation matrix for these variables.  The only variables which appear to 
have moderately high degrees of correlation are the Feature, Quantity, and Dutch.   
 
Table 2:  Description of Independent Variables 
 
Variable Description 
Dutch A dummy variable that is 1 if the auction is a Dutch auction and 0 otherwise.  A Dutch 
auction signifies that multiples of the same item are being sold in one auction to multiple 
bidders at the lowest accepted price. 
Reserve A dummy variable that is 1 if the auction has a reserve price and a 0 otherwise.  A 
reserve price is the minimum price at which the item can be sold for, but is not revealed 
until the reserve has been met. 
Picture A dummy variable that is 1 if the auction description includes a picture of the item and a 
0 otherwise. 
Quantity The number of items being sold to the high bidder.  This is different than a Dutch auction 
in that the high bidder buys ALL items being sold in that auction. 
Feature A dummy variable that is 1 if the auction is placed in a featured category and 0 
otherwise.  An item can be placed in a featured category for $9.95 that enhances the 
visibility of the item to potential bidders. 
LRating The log of the seller's rating.  Each seller has a rating based on feedback from previous 
transactions.  Each "positive" feedback increases the sellers rating by 1 point while each 
"negative" feedback decreases the sellers rating by 1 point. 
LTBT The log of the time (in seconds) from the previous completed auction for the same item. 
Count A trend variable that is equal to the auction number with the first auction taking a value 
of 1. 
 
Table 3:  Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
 
 Dutch Reserve Picture Quantity Feature LRating LTBT Count 
Dutch 1.000 -0.152 -0.002 -0.071  0.414  0.029  0.053  0.057 
Reserve   1.000 -0.137  0.115 -0.062 -0.103  0.049 -0.139 
Picture    1.000 -0.030  0.050  0.167  0.056  0.038 
Quantity     1.000  0.326 -0.019  0.054  0.052 
Feature      1.000  0.159  0.019  0.058 
LRating       1.000 -0.007  0.084 
LTBT        1.000 -0.101 
Count         1.000 
 
The primary data analysis method used is a regression model with a correction for autocorrelation.  Even 
with the inclusion of a trend variable, the regression model still exhibits auto correlated errors.  This issue is 
addressed through two different approaches.  The first technique is to an autocorrelation correction based on 
maximum likelihood methodology.  The results from this methodology are presented in Table Five. The second 
technique is to fit the price observations to an ARIMA model and then use the residuals from this model in the 
regression analysis.  The results from this methodology are presented in Table Six.  The results are robust to the 
methodology involved and the discussion of the results will focus on the maximum likelihood results.  The reason 
for choosing the maximum likelihood model is that by using the price (as opposed to a residual) for the dependent 
variable, the coefficients produced provide useful information to analyze selling strategies. 
 
There is also some concern over potential outliers in the data set.  While the recorded price represents the 
highest acceptable bid, there is no way to determine if the transaction was legitimately conducted and completed.  
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Occasionally, there are some transactions that appear to be abnormal.  For example the price change between some 
transactions is as much as a 99.5% increase or -73.8% decline.  It seems unreasonable to assume that the value of the 
product changed by such a large amount within a single transaction.  To account for this the primary results are 
presented using (1) all data points and (2) only those data points where the price change between transactions is 
between ±20%.6 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Seasonality appears to be present in the prices of our collectibles market.  In examining Table Four, one 
can see that the average price ranges from a low of $91.52 for Mondays to a high of $101.94 on Thursdays.  For 
time periods, the lowest average price is $91.99 from 9:00 PM to 12:00 AM PST while the highest average price is 
$104.57 from 12:00 AM to 6:00 AM PST.  Results from ANOVA analysis show that for the classifications, there is 
statistically significant seasonality at the 1% level.  However, looking at these seasonality patterns in isolation can 
be misleading.  Two other important components must be considered.  First, remember from Figures One and Three 
that there is a noticeable downward trend in prices from the start of the sample period to the end of the sample 
period.  Thus, the first day of the sample will likely have an upward bias while the last day of the sample will likely 
have a downward bias.  Second, we hypothesize that market depth may have an influence on prices.  Specifically, 
prices may be higher when fewer Glory Bears™ are available for auction and lower when a large amount of Glory 
Bears™ are available for auction.  In looking at Table Four, it is apparent that both average transactions per day and 
average transactions per period vary dramatically.  Thus, it is not clear whether the differences are due to seasonality 
or market depth without controlling for both in a regression framework. 
 
Table Four 
Seasonality Analysis 
 
This table illustrates the degree of seasonality present in the data.  Two issues are examined.  First, do 
prices tend to be higher on certain days (day-of-the-week analysis) and second, do prices tend to be higher at certain 
times of the day (time-of-day analysis).  The time periods are based on Pacific Standard Time and are described 
below. 
Table 4:  Average Price by Date and Time of Day 
 
All Observations Mon. Tues. Wed. Thur. Fri. Sat. Sun. 
Average Price $91.52 $91.83 $93.13 $101.94 $95.73 $90.48 $93.37 
Total Transactions 483 426 384 379 553 563 571 
Trans. per Day (Avg.) 96.60 85.20 76.80 94.75 138.25 140.75 114.20 
Restricted Observations* Mon. Tues. Wed. Thur. Fri. Sat. Sun. 
Average Price $91.27 $91.95 $92.26 $101.05 $94.83 $89.77 $93.47 
Total Transactions 444 391 328 334 499 525 537 
Trans. per Day (Avg.) 88.80 78.20 65.60 83.50 124.75 131.25 107.40 
All Observations Per. 1 Per. 2 Per. 3 Per. 4 Per. 5 Per. 6 Per. 7 
Average Price $104.57 $98.04 $92.28 $93.45 $92.20 $94.12 $91.99 
Total Transactions 73 359 454 549 679 826 419 
Trans. per Period (Avg.) 2.28 11.22 14.19 17.16 21.22 25.81 13.09 
Restricted Observations* Per. 1 Per. 2 Per. 3 Per. 4 Per. 5 Per. 6 Per. 7 
Average Price $104.38 $98.52 $91.97 $92.15 $91.53 $93.80 $91.21 
Total Transactions 66 333 412 490 626 751 380 
Trans. per Period (Avg.) 2.06 10.41 12.88 15.31 19.56 23.47 11.88 
*The restricted observations only include those transactions where the price change from the previous 
transaction was within ±20%.  This removes approximately 9% of the observations. 
 
Equality of Means Test for Day of the Week (ANOVA) 
 F6, 3352   = 8.61 (Significant at the 1% level) 
 *F6, 3051 = 7.34 (Significant at the 1% level) 
 
Equality of Means Test for Time of Day (ANOVA) 
 F6, 3352   = 4.35 (Significant at the 1% level) 
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 *F6, 3051 = 5.33 (Significant at the 1% level) 
 
The 1% level for an F-Statistic with 6, 3352 degrees of freedom is 2.807 
The 1% level for an F-Statistic with 6, 3051 degrees of freedom is 2.808 
 
  Start  Finish 
Period 1: 12:00 AM   6:00 AM 
Period 2: 6:00 AM  10:00 AM 
Period 3: 10:00 AM 2:00 PM 
Period 4: 2:00 PM 5:00 PM 
Period 5: 5:00 PM 7:00 PM 
Period 6: 7:00 PM 9:00 PM 
Period 7: 9:00 PM 12:00 AM  
 
In Table Five, the results of three separate regressions are reported.  All three usethe transaction price as the 
dependent variable.  The first includes the full complement of independent variables discussed earlier along with 
day-of-the-week dummy variables.  The second includes the full complement of independent variables with no 
seasonality dummy variables.  Finally, the third includes the full complement of independent variables with time-of-
day dummy variables.  This allows us to capture any seasonality on transaction prices while controlling for other 
effects.  F-Tests are performed to determine if the unrestricted models (seasonality) contain significantly more 
information than the restricted model (no seasonality).  The results indicate that the day-of-the-week seasonality is 
significant while the time-of-the-day seasonality appears to be insignificant.7  When controlling for other factors, it 
appears that prices are depressed somewhat on weekends with Thursday, Friday, and Saturday exhibiting the lowest 
coefficients. 
Table Five 
Seasonality with Regression Analysis 
 
This table examines the issue of seasonality in a regression format.  The transaction price is regressed on 
potential explanatory variables in addition to the seasonality variables.  All independent variables are strongly 
significant with the anticipated signs.  An F-Test is then performed to see if the seasonality variables make a 
significant contribution to the analysis.  The regression analysis detects a significant degree of autocorrelation which 
is accounted for through Maximum Likelihood methodology out to five lags.  Observations where the percentage 
change from the previous transaction exceeds ±20% have been removed.  Results using all observations are 
consistent with those reported below and are available upon request. 
 
Table 5:  Seasonality of Transaction Price with Regression Analysis 
 
Variable Coef. T-Value Variable Coef. T-Value Variable Coef. T-Value 
INT   INT 131.179 98.957 INT   
DUTCH -2.696 -4.963 DUTCH -2.697 -4.977 DUTCH -2.713 -5.002 
RESERVE 1.031 3.444 RESERVE 1.070 3.544 RESERVE 1.044 3.457 
PICTURE 2.853 8.654 PICTURE 2.842 8.646 PICTURE 2.867 8.705 
QUANT -0.774 -14.446 QUANT -0.775 -14.510 QUANT -0.777 -14.528 
FEATURE 4.359 8.243 FEATURE 4.383 8.314 FEATURE 4.382 8.300 
LRATING 0.305 4.163 LRATING 0.299 4.094 LRATING 0.291 3.982 
LTBT 0.737 8.944 LTBT 0.742 9.021 LTBT 0.733 8.843 
COUNT -0.026 -48.491 COUNT -0.025 -40.516 COUNT -0.025 -41.964 
MON 134.735 84.461    PER1 133.083 77.849 
TUES 133.380 80.122    PER2 133.468 88.154 
WED 135.594 78.868    PER3 132.190 88.593 
THUR 130.913 82.074    PER4 129.957 89.586 
FRI 128.052 87.494    PER5 130.183 92.432 
SAT 128.743 86.160    PER6 130.771 94.003 
SUN 133.116 89.160    PER7 132.402 89.212 
AR(1) -0.382 -21.023 AR(1) -0.393 -21.673 AR(1) -0.392 -21.575 
AR(2) -0.163 -8.438 AR(2) -0.172 -8.873 AR(2) -0.169 -8.718 
AR(3) -0.061 -3.096 AR(3) -0.653 -3.330 AR(3) -0.066 -3.342 
AR(4) -0.094 -4.842 AR(4) -0.100 -5.136 AR(4) -0.098 -5.043 
AR(5) -0.056 -3.064 AR(5) -0.066 -3.633 AR(5) -0.064 -3.522 
SSE 144,278  SSE 145,621  SSE 145,022  
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F-Test for Day-of-the-Week Effect 
 
      (145,621 - 144,278)/7 
 F7,3039 =  --------------------------   = 4.04 (Significant at the 1% Level) 
      144,278/(3059 - 20) 
 
F-Test for Time-of-the-Day Effect 
 
      (145,621 - 145,022)/7 
 F7,3039 =  --------------------------   = 1.80 Not Significant 
      145,022/(3059 - 20) 
 
The 1% level for an F-Statistic with 7, 3039 degrees of freedom is 2.645 
The 5% level for an F-Statistic with 7, 3039 degrees of freedom is 2.012 
 
 
Table Six 
Regression Results Using ARIMA Residuals 
 
Table 6 presents the regression results for the model using ARIMA residuals as the dependent variable.  
First, an ARIMA model (1,1,1) is fit to the PRICE variable.  Then the residuals from the ARIMA model are used as 
the dependent variable.  This procedure removes the time-series elements from the PRICE variable and allows the 
remaining variation to be modeled by the independent variables.  In the process, the high degree of autocorrelation is 
eliminated.  The results are consistent with those presented in Table Five with price used as the dependent variable 
and are also consistent with expectations.  The results are presented without either of the seasonality dummies 
(results using day-of-the-week and time-of-the-day dummy variables are available upon request.)  Results are 
presented using all observations and with outliers removed. 
 
Table 6:  Regression Result 
 
All Observations Observations with Price Fluctuations Between 
±20% 
Variable Coef. T-Value Variable Coef. T-Value 
INTERCEPT -6.2102 -8.97** INTERCEPT -5.1954 -9.14** 
DUTCH -4.7409 -6.99** DUTCH -3.0065 -5.17** 
RESERVE 1.2870 3.53** RESERVE 0.9386 3.12** 
PICTURE 3.5826 8.83** PICTURE 2.9174 8.70** 
QUANT -1.1021 -16.81** QUANT -0.7483 -13.17** 
FEATURE 7.3126 11.48** FEATURE 4.2351 7.64** 
LRATING 0.3374 3.76** LRATING 0.3109 4.18** 
LTBT 0.9083 9.69** LTBT 0.6926 8.95** 
COUNT 0.0004 2.71** COUNT 0.0003 2.31* 
* significant at the 5% level 
** significant at the 1% level 
 
ARIMA Model All Observations 
 
Model Parameter Estimate T-Value 
Intercept -0.0283    -1.72 
Moving Average, Lag 1   0.9173 117.80** 
Autoregressive, Lag 1  0.1724     8.97** 
 
ARIMA Model with Price Fluctuations Between ±20% 
 
Model Parameter Estimate T-Value 
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Intercept -0.0314    -1.72 
Moving Average, Lag 1   0.9109 100.26** 
Autoregressive, Lag 1  0.3502   17.00** 
 
 
There are other points of note from the regressions using price as the dependent variable aside from the 
discussion of seasonality.  First, the coefficients of the other independent variables are all highly significant and 
consistent regardless of whether or not seasonality is included in the analysis.  The signs on the each of the 
coefficients are also consistent with expectations.   
 
 The coefficients on DUTCH and QUANTITY allow us to draw some inferences regarding the optimal 
strategy for sellers.  When there are larger quantities of Glory Bears™ available, prices seem to decline.  On the 
other hand, listing multiple auctions can result in higher fees.8  The answer to whether it is better to list multiple 
auctions of a single item or one auction for multiple items to a single high bidder depends on the quantity of items 
being sold, the initial listing fee, and the average selling price per item.  However either of these selling methods 
appears to be a better alternative than a Dutch auction.  To illustrate this, consider a person auctioning 12 (a 
common quantity seen in our sample) Ty Glory Bears™.  Assume that the final selling price per bear is $93.75 (the 
mean of our entire sample) if the seller sells these items through 12 separate auctions.  The fee to list an auction can 
range from $0.25 to $2.00 assuming that it is not listed as a featured item.  In addition, the seller will pay fees of 
$2.97 based on the selling price for a total cost of $3.22 to $4.97 per auction.  This would net the seller between 
$88.78 and $90.53 per item.  Selling the 12 together as a package should lower the sales price by approximately 
$0.78 per bear for a final auction value of $1115.64.  Taking out fees ranging from $39.82 to $41.57 would result in 
a realized price per bear of $89.51 to $89.65.  Listing items in a Dutch Auction lowers the amount received per item 
by approximately $2.70 for a final auction value of $1092.60.  For Dutch auctions the listing fee is multiplied per 
item up to a maximum of $2.00.  This leaves the seller with $88.65 per item.  Therefore, the optimal strategy would 
be to list each item separately with an opening price of $9.99.  If the opening price were raised beyond $49.99, then 
it would be slightly more profitable to move to a quantity auction of all items.  The least profitable strategy is a 
Dutch auction.  One possible explanation for this is that shipping cost per bear (an additional fee paid by the seller) 
would likely be smaller for a quantity auction than it would for a Dutch auction. 
 
There appears to be some impact of information signaling.  The two variables used to designate information 
content, PICTURE and LRATING, both have positive coefficients ($2.85 and $0.30, respectively).  For most sellers, 
posting a digital picture will have no monetary cost since the majority of Internet Service Providers provide the 
ability to store a limited number of pictures in a personalized area for no additional cost.  In the event that 
commercial services are used, the fees are generally less than $2.00 per picture.  Thus, in a net sense, the seller can 
receive an excess rent of at least $0.85 and more reasonably $2.85 by displaying a picture.   This indicates that 
buyers are willing to pay a premium for a product that they can see (at least in a photo) and for a quality reputation 
by the seller.  Visibility apparently does not benefit the seller unless the seller has at least 3 items for sell as a group 
or in a Dutch auction.  Featured auctions tend to bring in a higher average selling price (approximately $4.40), but 
costs the seller $9.95.  This is clearly a losing proposition for the seller who is selling one or two items.9 
 
Finally, the longer the time between transactions (LTBT), the higher the price that is realized.  The positive 
coefficient for the RESERVE variable indicates that having a reserve price, as expected, keeps the item from selling 
at an "unacceptably" low price.  However, the positive coefficient on the RESERVE variable needs to be viewed 
with caution.  As only completed auctions are used in our sample, auctions that failed to meet the reserve price were 
not included.  If the seller still desires to sell the item, it would need to be relisted.  Given the trend of declining 
prices over our sample period, the item would likely receive a lower bid during the second listing than it would have 
without a reserve initially.  The final independent variable, COUNT, is merely a control for the downward trend in 
prices and exhibits a strong, negative relationship with price and is consistent with the graphs of transaction prices 
presented in Tables One and Three. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to examine a market with different characteristics than a typical 
"financial" market using high frequency continuous transactions data to see if some of the same patterns (signaling 
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of information and seasonality) appear as well as to examine the depth of this alternative market.  The market 
selected is an Internet auction market for collectibles, specifically the auction results for Ty Glory Bears™ on the 
eBay, Inc. web site.  This market was selected for its relatively high activity and homogeneity among collectibles 
markets.  Also, it provided a wealth of information related to signaling content, seasonality, and market depth.  The 
results indicate that Internet auction markets may indeed resemble typical financial markets, at least to some degree.  
There is evidence of signaling related to seller's reputation and product information.  Seasonality appears to exist to 
some degree based on the day of the week.  There is also evidence that market depth may have an impact on 
transaction prices.  Finally, visibility to buyer's and reserve pricing also appear to generate slightly higher 
transaction prices. 
 
There are several avenues for future research on Internet auction markets.  First, while our data set has a 
large number of observations, the time period is relatively short.  It would be interesting to examine similar issues 
over a time period of one or more years.  Second, do these patterns hold in other internet auction markets either 
outside of eBay or outside of the collectibles arena?  A third avenue, closely related to the previous two, might 
explore how market patterns differ as the volume of transactions and evolution of Internet auction markets change.   
Finally, if similar seasonality patterns are shown in different Internet auction markets, can these be explained by a 
structural characteristic of these markets? 
 
ENDNOTES 
1Typically, inefficiencies are uncovered, however these inefficiencies are usually recognized and disappear in a 
relatively short time period or are small enough that they can not generate profits in excess of trading costs. 
 
2For instance, Houser and Wooders (2000) examine Pentium III transactions and obtain a sample size of 94 
observations over the course of a three-month period.  McDonald and Slawson (2000) examine Harley-Davidson 
Barbie dolls and obtain a sample of 451 auctions during a seven-month period. 
 
3Consider a situation where the current high bid is $20.00 and the minimum bid increment is $0.50.  If I bid $25.00, 
this will raise the current bid only to $20.50.  If another bidder would then try to bid $22.00, the eBay system of 
proxy bidding would raise the current price to $22.00, but maintain me as the high bidder. 
 
4The segmentation of the day into seven time-of-day dummies is arbitrary.  The intent was to segment according to 
"reasonable" time blocks (early morning, middle-of-day, early afternoon, etc.) while trying to keep average 
transactions from varying by too large of a degree from period to period.  The specific breakdowns are presented in 
Table Four. 
 
5In the rare event that a seller had feedback rating with a negative value that transaction was dropped from the 
sample.  In each case where this occurred the comments associated with the rating indicated that the transaction was 
not completed (i.e. the seller never delivered the item).  If the feedback rating was 0, the actual feedback rating was 
used instead of the log. 
 
6The elimination of data points where price changes are greater than ±20% is arbitrary.  We also examined a cutoff 
level of ±30% and found similar results.  The elimination of these data points reduces the number of transactions by 
just less than 10% from the full sample.  In addition, it allows the autocorrelation to be truncated much more rapidly. 
 
7All times are recorded in Pacific Standard Time which is consistent with the timing system used by eBay, Inc.  
However, time zone issues may make it more difficult to document time-of-the-day seasonalities due to time zone 
differences between east and west coast (as well as international) bidders. 
 
8The listing fees are based on the opening price set by the seller.  At the time this data was collected, these fees were 
$0.25 for opening prices less than $9.99, $0.50 for opening prices between $10 and $24.99, $1.00 for opening prices 
between $25.00 and $49.99, and $2.00 for opening prices $50 and up.  Currently, these fees are $0.30 for opening 
prices less than $9.99, $0.55 for opening prices between $10 and $24.99, $1.10 for opening prices between $25.00 
and $49.99, $2.20 for opening prices between $50 and $199.99 and $3.30 for opening prices $200 and up.  Reserve 
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fees were not charged at this time, but they are currently $0.50 up to $24.99 and $1.00 beyond $25.00).  Also, 
optional fees for gift icons, gallery, featured gallery, bold, and highlight were not available.  In addition, sales fee 
were 5% of the final sales price up to $25 plus 2.5% of the additional price between $25.01 and $1,000 plus 1.25% 
of the additional price beyond $1000.01.  Currently, sales fees are 5.75% of the final sales price up to $25 plus 
2.75% of the additional price between $25.01 and $1000 plus 1.5% of the additional price beyond $1000.01.  
Finally, the “Buy-it-Now” option was not available at the time this data was collected. 
 
9While it may appear that sellers are not earning back their $9.95 additional fee to place an item in the featured 
category, in actuality they are likely to be earning back their fee plus a profit.  Many featured items are on Dutch and 
quantity listings.  As long as three or more units are for sale per listing, the featured item would earn back the $9.95 
fee plus a profit.  The $9.95 represented the cost of listing an item as featured within a category at the time the data 
was collected.  This price has currently been raised to $19.95. 
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